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In a Downsian model of political competition we compare the equilibrium tax and
redistribution level obtained from two systems to ￿nance parties￿political campaigns:
the public and the private system. In the private system ideological voters make
campaign contributions to increase the chances of winning of their preferred party. In
the public system parties receive funds from the government. If voters are su¢ ciently
ideological the private system induces high aggregate spending. Nevertheless, it may
be supported by a majority of voters given the indirect e⁄ect contributions have on
the equilibrium redistribution level and parties￿probability of winning.
Keywords: Political economy ￿redistribution ￿campaign ￿nance.
1 Introduction
Campaign ￿nance regulation has been the subject of public debate since recent reforms on
U.S. (the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 2002) and Canada (Bill C-24, 2003). Di⁄erent
arguments in favor and against more public funds in politics and the fairness of the system
shed light on the complexity to drive an unambiguous answer on the optimal policy to
￿nance political parties￿campaigns.
Previous literature on this subject argues that the optimality of a policy, the cap on
contributions, for example, depends strongly on the assumptions made on the motivation
of interest groups and the informativeness of the campaign.
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1This paper investigates the political sustainability of the private system to ￿nance
political parties. While the public system favors centrist policies on both, the economic
and non-economic issues. The private system allows for more extremist outcomes that may
￿t better some societies. We ￿nd that a majority of voters may favor the private system
when asymmetry on the intensity of preferences toward the non-economic issue is large.
We assume interest groups give campaign contributions to increase the voting share of
a candidate with similar ideology (e.g. Grossman and Helpman 1996, 2001). We take the
approach of Grossman and Helpman (1996), Ortuæo-Ort￿n and Schultz (2005) and Roemer
(2006) under which campaign spending do not provide information to voters. It increases
the probability of winning among uninformed or impressionable voters.
We assume parties held ￿xed a position toward the non-economic issue. Political parties
choose a purely redistributive proportional income tax to maximize their probability of
winning. Parties face a trade-o⁄: On the one hand, they increase the probability of winning
by choosing a more centrist policy on the economic issue, that attracts middle class voters
(because by assumption voters in the middle class are swing voters); and, on the other hand,
they want to please their partisans by moving toward a more extreme policy in order to
increase campaign contributions that also increase their chances of winning the elections
among uninformed voters. Note that our parties are Downsian, the only motivation to
choose a policy di⁄erent from the preferred tax of the median voter is to collect money
from partisan voters or deter contributions to the rival party. We study what the expected
policy in the economic and non-economic issues is in two di⁄erent (and extreme) models
to ￿nance political campaign: the private and the public system. In the private system,
voters can freely contribute to their most preferred party. In the public system, private
donations to political parties are illegal and parties can only receive funds from the state
in proportion to their voting share. We analyze in which circumstances (ideology intensity,
e⁄ectiveness of campaign, number of informed voters) a private system would be supported
by a majority of voters.
As in Glazer and Gradstein (2005) voters/citizens make campaign contributions to in-
crease the chances of winning of their preferred party. In their paper parties maximize
contributions, since the problem is unidimensional parties￿policies need to diverge su¢ -
ciently enough to attract contributions. In our paper parties maximize the probability of
winning. Since campaign spending increases the probability of winning parties trade-o⁄
extreme policies that attract higher contributions and moderate policies that please the
median voter. Such a trade-o⁄ is not present in Glazer and Gradstein (2005).
2In the public system both parties have equal chances of winning and the equilibrium
tax rate is the most preferred tax rate of the median voter. In the private system the
equilibrium income tax is closer to the preferred income tax of the less ideological voter
and the preferred party of the most ideological voter has the highest probability of winning.
In our setting political campaign does not bring any information to voters. In the private
system competition among ideological voters (contributors) may induce excessive spending
in political campaign. Still, it may be preferred by a majority of voters given the indirect
e⁄ect contributions have on the equilibrium income tax and parties￿probability of winning.
We also compare the welfare implications of di⁄erent policy reforms as a cap on contri-
butions. An intermediate cap decreases aggregate contributions and bene￿ts the group of
voters not constrained by the cap. An strict cap, that constraints both ideological voters,
makes the median voter better o⁄.
We develop some numerical examples to understand how the di⁄erent e⁄ects in favor
and against the private system to ￿nance political parties interact. The private system
does not seem to have enough support from voters when ideological voters are equally
or almost equally attached to political parties. The reason is that in such a case, where
the society is homogenous, voters favor the system that brings then the highest economic
utility, having ideological voters opposite economic preferences, a coalition of the median
voter and at least one ideological voter will prefer the public system over the private one.
When ideological preferences are asymmetric enough both ideological voters are pleased.
The economic issue is closer to the preferred one by the less ideological voter. The expected
non-economic issue (the party in o¢ ce) is closer to most ideological voters preferred one.
Both ideological voters then, support the private system to ￿nance political parties. In
more asymmetric (heterogenous) societies the private system has higher political support.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we comment the related literature.
Section 3 presents the model and the characteristics of a private system to ￿nance political
campaigns. The contribution stage is developed in section 4. The equilibrium income tax
and the introduction of a cap on contributions are described in section 5. In section 6
we study what would be the equilibrium income tax and probability of winning of each
party in a purely public system to ￿nance political parties. In section 7 we compare both
systems. Section 8 concludes.
32 Literature review
Previous literature on political campaign ￿nance focuses on the welfare impact of policy
reforms as a ban of contributions or the introduction of a ceiling either on contributions or
on campaign spending. One of the central lessons that has emerged from this literature has
been that both positive and normative conclusions depend strongly on assumptions made
about the role of campaign advertisement, the rationality of voters and the motivation of
contributors.
Formal models of elections with campaign contributions can be categorized according to
two aspects. The ￿rst distinction concerns assumptions about the motivation of campaign
contributions. An interest group may contribute money to in￿ uence the policy outcome,
the in￿ uence motive; or in order to receive services or policy favors from the candidate,
the service motive for contributions. Alternatively, an interest group may contribute to an
alike candidate to increase her chances of winning. This is known in the literature as the
electoral or position-induced motive. Magee (2001, 2002) has empirical evidence in favor of
service-motivated contributions and the electoral motive for contributions. Ansolabehere
et al. (2003) ￿nd that money to ￿nance campaign spending comes mainly from individual
donations, their study shows evidence that favors the electoral or position-induced motive
for contributions.
The second distinction concerns assumptions about the e⁄ects of campaign spending on
voter behavior and election outcome. The e⁄ect of contributions on the election outcome
depends on whether we assume that voters are impressionable or rational. Impressionable
voters, in general, do not have a speci￿c policy position either in the economic or the
ideological dimension. They are called impressionable because they vote with a higher
probability for the party advertising the most. On the other hand, when campaigns are
informative, they provide information to voters on the parties platforms. Rational voters
use this information to vote for the party that gives them the highest utility.
When campaign advertisement is informative (e.g. Schultz 2007; Coate 2004a, 2004b;
Vanberg 2004) voters rationally update their beliefs about the policy position or type of
a candidate as a function of advertisement received by parties (in general there are two
parties).
When campaign advertisement is informative di⁄erent assumption on the motivations
of interest-group contributions have di⁄erent welfare implications. If the motivation of
interest-group contributions is position-induced (e.g. Coate 2004a) contribution limits
4bene￿t interest groups by decreasing competition among them. If instead we have a service-
motive for campaign contributions (e.g. Coate 2004b) a cap on contributions is welfare
enhancing. It will reduce policy favors without any e⁄ect on the quality of the selected
leader.
None of these works consider asymmetries in the access to funds by parties. Vanberg
(2004) introduces such asymmetries by assuming that the interest group associated with
party R is bigger. Party R is wealthier since the same per-capita contribution gives a higher
total contribution level. The higher probability of winning of the advantaged party from
the larger population covered by the advertisement outset the lower probability of winning
among uninformed voters. The probability of winning is, then, independent on the access
to funds by parties. So, contribution limits (such that party L is not constrained) favor
members of the wealthier interest group since it decreases per-capita contributions levels.
Roemer (2006) considers a very di⁄erent setting, parties are endogenously formed and
political campaigns are not informative, they reach impressionable voters. Within the
party, contributions are shared e¢ ciently. When campaigns are not informative, asymme-
tries in the access to funds skew the policy outcome in favor of the ￿nancially stronger
party, i.e. the pivotal voter is richer than the median income voter. Similar results are
found in Ortuæo-Ort￿n and Schultz (2005) with ideological parties (￿ la Wittman). The
availability of private contributions allows the wealthier party, say party R, to choose a
more extreme policy. The expected platform then is more to the right than if only public
funding was allowed.
3 Privately ￿nanced political parties
Assume we have three groups of voters di⁄erentiated by their earnings ability wj, indexed
by j = 1;2;3 with 0 < w1 < w2 < w3. The proportion of voters in each group is the same
and equals 1
3. Income is linear in labor supply and takes the form yj = wjlj. Therefore,
per-capita income of this economy is ￿ = 1
3(y1 + y2 + y3). Within each group, there is a
￿xed proportion (1 ￿ ￿) 2 (0;1) of uninformed or impressionable voters. Parties can win
these impressionable voters only by campaigning. Informed voters are also di⁄erentiated by
their intensity of preferences toward parties (or the non-economic issue that characterizes
them). In this dimension we identify two types of voters: ideological and indi⁄erent or
swing voters. For simplicity we assume that voters in group 1 and 3 are ideological. Voters
have a bias ￿j toward party L, with ￿1 > 0; ￿2 = 0 and ￿3 < 0. Ideological preferences
5are then, perfectly correlated with income. We often refer to voters 1 and 3 as ideological
voters.
Political competition takes place between two o¢ ce motivated parties, L and R: They
hold ￿xed their political position toward the non-economic issue. The pliable issue is a
marginal income tax tP that ￿nances a lump-sum transfer rP; with P = L;R: The non-
economic issue can be interpreted as a political position that does not directly a⁄ect the tax
revenue and the redistribution level. One example is the ￿ moral values￿issue that played
an important role in the Bush campaign.
Ideological voters play two roles. They may be contributors to political parties in a
￿rst stage and voters in a second stage.
Political parties choose a policy platform (tP;rP), P = L;R, and spend contributions
received from ideological voters on political campaign to attract uninformed or impression-
able voters. Anticipating the e⁄ect of the announced platform on the level of contributions,
political parties choose the political platform that maximizes the probability of winning
given the policy chosen by their rival.
The game goes as follows: ￿rst, parties announce simultaneously the political platforms
(tP;rP); P = L;R: We assume full commitment to the platform announced. Second, ide-
ological voters give contributions (if any) to their preferred party. Contributions received
by political parties ￿nance political campaigns that in￿ uence the voting decision of im-
pressionable voters. At the third stage all voters take part in the election. The winning
candidate implements the policy announced. At the last stage of the game voters make
consumption and labor decisions. The model is solved backwards.
3.1 The tax schedule
A proportional tax with marginal tax rate t 2 [0;1] is collected to ￿nance a lump-sum
transfer or redistribution level r. The budget balanced condition gives us a redistribution
function r(t),
r(t) = t￿(t) (1)
Note that average income is endogenously determined and depends upon the labor decision
of voters. If labor supply is decreasing in taxes (leisure is a normal good) the redistribution
function is concave in t: The peak of the La⁄er curve, the t that maximizes redistribution
is t : ￿(t) + t
@￿
@t = 0: From labor disincentives ￿(:) is decreasing in t.
63.2 Voters
The economic utility is represented as:





Where xj and lj are consumption and labor supply of a voter in group j. Consumption
equals after-tax income, xj = (1 ￿ t)wjlj+r: Once the voting stage takes place the winning
party implements the platform announced. Voters make consumption and labor decisions
that maximize utility. The optimal labor supply is lj = (1 ￿ t)wj. Labor supply is strictly
positive, for t < 1. The income level of a voter j is given by yj = (1 ￿ t)w2
j. The peak of
the La⁄er curve is t = 1
2:
Informed voters
Informed voters are divided in ideological, group 1 and 3; and swing voters, voters in
group 2. By ideological we mean that they have clear and relatively extreme views toward
the non-economic issue that characterizes a party. The indirect utility of a voter in group
j if party L wins the election is,
Vj;L = uj (tL) + ￿j (2)
Where tL is the income tax rate announced by political party L, and uj (t) is the
indirect economic utility of voter j at the optimal labor supply. The lump-sum transfer
r is determined from the budget balanced condition (1). The parameter ￿j measures the
relative position (or attachment) of a voter in group j toward the non-economic issue that
characterizes party L. Net from contributions indirect utility for group j is Vj;L ￿ Cj.











and t3 = 0
Where w2 = 1
3
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and t2 < t1. The preferred tax of group 2,
t2, will be strictly positive as long as w2 is smaller than
p
w2. Assume the median earnings
ability, w2, is smaller than the average earnings ability, w = 1
3
P
w; which guarantees t2 >
70. This comes from the following ordering1:
p
w2 > w > w2. From now on we characterize
voters by their preferred income tax tj and their ideology ￿j. Another distinction between
ideological and swing voters is that campaign contributions are given by ideological voters.
In equilibrium voters in group 2 do not have interest in contributing.
Uninformed voters
We assume swing or impressionable voters are captured (in￿ uenced) by political adver-
tisement. The e⁄ect of campaign advertisement of party L and R that spend CL and CR,
respectively, increases the probability of winning of party L among uninformed voters by
g (CL;CR).
We next identify properties and conditions the function g (:) satisfy.
1. Symmetry: Given two levels of campaign spending CL;CR ￿ 0, g (CL;CR) = ￿g (CR;CL).
2. g is twice continuously di⁄erentiable.
3. We assume g11 < 0 and g22 > 0; which implies g11g22 ￿ (g12)
2 < 0, where gi is the
derivative of g with respect to the i￿th argument.
4. The probability of winning among uninformed voters by party L if party R does not
make political campaign (CR = 0) tends to one. By symmetry the same applies to
party R.
In some circumstances it would be better for both groups of ideological voters not to
contribute to political parties. Condition 4 rules out this possibility in equilibrium. If CR =
0 the probability of winning of party L would increase sharply if voters in group 1 contribute
1$ to party L (analogous for group 3). Condition 4, then, guarantees us an equilibrium with
strictly positive contributions. Condition 2 guarantees that the equilibrium with positive
contributions is asymptotically stable. In section 5 we give three examples of functions
satisfying these properties and conditions.
3.3 Parties
Parties announce a policy platform: an income tax and a redistribution level that maximizes
their probability of winning. Parties full commit to the platform announced. Once in o¢ ce
parties implement their preferred position toward the non-economic issue hold ￿xed during
1For the variance of w to be positive we need w <
p
w2.
8election campaigns. We develop the error distribution approach (Roemer, 2001) to model
uncertainty. Whenever Vj;L > Vj;R group j prefers tL to tR. Parties are con￿dent about
this up to a margin of error, ". The error parties make in measuring the probability of
winning is uniformly distributed in [￿￿;￿]. Among the informed voters, the probability
that group j will vote for party L is,
Pr(" ￿ Vj;L ￿ Vj;R)
We assume for simplicity that ￿1 and j ￿3 j are su¢ ciently high. Indeed for ￿1,j ￿3 j> ￿
group 1 and 3 probability to vote for party L and R, respectively, equals one.2 The







2￿ (V2;L ￿ V2;R) if ￿ ￿ ￿ X ￿ ￿
1 if X < ￿￿
0 if X > ￿
where X = V2;L ￿ V2;R.
The function ￿2 represents party L￿ s probability to win the support of informed voters
in group 2. There is a proportion of ￿ informed voters. Among uninformed voters, party
L can also increase its probability of winning by campaigning.












Note that the announced income tax will induce a certain level of contributions from
ideological groups. Parties, then, anticipate the e⁄ect of the income tax announced on the
competition for contributions.
4 Contribution stage
Parties are the means to get implemented the most preferred position toward the non-
economic issue of ideological voters. If party L wins the election it bene￿ts all voters in
2In equilibrium, for ￿1 and j￿3j su¢ ciently high, informed voters in group 1 votes for party L while
informed voters in 3 votes for party R. This will be proved later, when determining the platforms chosen
by parties.
9group 1. In this sense party L generates a positive externality to voters in group 1 if she
wins the election (analogous for group 3 and the party R). Following the literature on
private contributions to public goods (e.g. Andreoni 1988, 1998; Bergstrom et al. 1986) we
know that the most ideological voters will contribute to their most preferred party. When
deciding on contributions voters already know the policy position undertaken by parties.
In any case a group would not contribute to a party he would not vote for at the voting
stage. As long as V1;L ￿ V1;R > 0 group 1 whenever it contributes it does it to party L,
while group 3 will contribute to party R, if it contributes. Indeed ideological voters are
advocates of the non-economic issue associated with a party since campaigning increases
uninformed voters support toward parties. Voters in group 2 are not ideological, if they
contribute to a party is because they perceive that by contributing they can increase the
probability of winning of the party that brings then the highest economic utility. Though,
in equilibrium voters in group 2 do not contribute. As we will see later, when platforms
converge group 2 is indi⁄erent among the two parties.3
The expected utility of a voter in group 1 takes the following form,
EV1 (tL;tR) = ￿V1;L + (1 ￿ ￿)V1;R ￿ C1
Ideological voters choose a contribution level C1 ￿ 0 that maximizes their expected utility.
Whenever ￿1 is su¢ ciently large, group 1 will be willing to contribute. If there is a
continuum of identical voters in each group an additional moral principle assumption should
be made to escape the free-riding problem. See, for instance, Roemer (2006), which assumes
voters follow a Kantian principle: Where all group members, if equal, pay the same, an
individual deviation imply then, a deviation for all members of the group. A deviation
from the contribution level for one single voter would imply a deviation of the same size
by all of the voters in that group. This guarantees strictly positive levels of contributions.
Group 1 chooses C1 that equals party L￿ s campaign spending, by maximizing EV1 (tL;tR)
taking CR as given. From here on we refer to C1;CL or C3;CR indistinctly although they
3The di⁄erence in utilities, V2;L ￿V2;R, need to be su¢ ciently high for group 2 be willing to contribute.
Indeed it equals zero if platforms convergence, which is the case, see section 5.






(V1;L ￿ V1;R) ￿ 1 ￿ 0 (CL = 0 if inequality)
For the particular function of probability of winning,




(1 ￿ ￿)(V1;L ￿ V1;R)
;CR
￿
where m = g￿1





, contributions to party L
increase with utility di⁄erence V1;L￿V1;R, which is increasing in the ideological preferences
of group 1, ￿1. The higher the proportion of informed voters, ￿, the lower is the contribution
level. Because campaign spending will be less e⁄ective, there will be a small increase in
the probability of winning for a party spending an extra dollar in campaigning.






(V3;L ￿ V3;R) ￿ 1 ￿ 0 (CR = 0 if inequality)
For the particular function of probability of winning,




(1 ￿ ￿)(V3;R ￿ V3;L)
;CL
￿
where n = ￿g￿1
2 . Some boundaries on contributions should be introduced to guarantee an
a⁄ordable contribution level. We assume that Cj ￿ xj (te); j = 1;3.
Note that (CL;CR) = (0;0) is not an equilibrium if condition 4 on the function
g (CL;CR) holds.
Lemma 1 If properties 1-4 of the function g (CL;CR) are satis￿ed a unique equilibrium
with positive contributions exists.
4Second order conditions are satis￿ed provided that group 1 prefers party L : V1;L￿V1;R > 0. Otherwise,
group 1 would not choose to contribute. Note that the platform was already announced and parties fully
commit to the platform announced. The same logic applies when determining contributions by group 3,
this time V3;L ￿ V3;R < 0.
11Proof. In the appendix.
Contribution levels depend on parties tax schedules. If party L please their partisans
(voters from group 1), this has two e⁄ects on contributions: it increases contributions
from group 1, because it increases the economic advantage from having party L in power
(V1;L ￿ V1;R). Since taxes are purely redistributive group 3 will be paying higher taxes
under the party L policy, then, contributions from group 3 to party R may also increase.
Each party is aware of the e⁄ect of its announced platform on contributions given to itself
and its rival party. Notice that if party L chooses a policy platform on the pliable issue
(taxes) favoring group 1, it is solely because this allows party L to increase contributions
from that group. Party L, then, may bene￿t group 2 or even group 3 if by doing so she
increases the political support from informed voters in group 2 or decrease contributions
to party R more than contributions to her decrease.
5 Choice of platform
Political parties choose their platforms knowing that campaign contributions will be af-
fected by their policy choices. Party L maximizes the probability of winning, ￿, while






























Group 2 has no a priory bias toward any of the parties. By assuming ￿2 = 0 we avoid
consideration of policy choices when there is an advantaged candidate (e.g. AragonŁs and
Palfrey 2005; Sahuguet and Persico 2006). The conditions to have convergence of platforms






jtL=tR=t= 0; P = L;R. If the
marginal cost of an additional contribution is independent of the platform announced by
parties from symmetry of g (:) symmetry on contributions hold (see appendix A).
Parties faces a trade-o⁄: on the one hand they want to please the median voter to
increase the probability of winning among informed voters. But they can also increase the
probability of winning by campaigning. To collect more contributions parties have to favor
12their partisans, to deter contributions to the rival party they have to favor rivals￿ s party
partisans. As a consequence the equilibrium income tax is not necessarily equal to the
median voter preferred income tax, t2. Next proposition summarizes the condition under
which the equilibrium income tax is lower (higher) than the median voter preferred income
tax.
Proposition 2 1) Suppose the second order conditions are satis￿ed. The equilibrium tax



























;(equal to t2 if equality) (7)
Where ￿ = g1 (g1g22 ￿ g2g12)=g2 (g1g12 ￿ g2g11). Otherwise it will be lower than t2.
In the symmetric case: ￿1 = j￿3j = ￿, the equilibrium income tax will be smaller than the
median preferred income tax as long as w2 < w, where w is the mean earnings ability.
Proof. In the appendix
The left hand side of (7) is the relative intensity of party preferences, weighted by the
parameters of the advertisement function. The higher is j￿3j with respect to ￿1 the easier
condition (7) will be satis￿ed and the closer will be the tax rate to t1. This is a swing
voter e⁄ect: The tax schedule favors the less ideological voters. For j￿3j high, the gain in
contributions from group 3 to party R when tR decreases is small because (V3;R ￿ V3;L)
is already very high. Party R will rather favor the median voter in order to increase the
probability of winning. If ￿1 is relatively small party L could increase campaign spending
by increasing tL from t2 (without increasing too much contributions to its rival). When
tL is above t2 a further increase in tL increases contributions to party L but decreases the
utility of the median voter. The e⁄ect of the advertisement function on the equilibrium
income tax is harder to analyze. It is interesting to note, though, that in many examples












5This is true for the following advertisement functions: g (CL;CR) =
(CL)k￿(CR)k
(CL)k+(CR)k , for any 0 < k ￿ 1.
13The right hand side of (7) is the relative earnings di⁄erential with respect to voter
2: The equilibrium income tax moves in a direction that bene￿ts the voter with earnings
further away from w2. This is because the closer w1, say, to w2, the closer will be t1 to t2.
Contributions from group 1 will be already high if party L chooses tL = t2: Instead party
L would ￿nd more pro￿table to choose a lower income tax rate than t2 in order to decrease
group 3 contributions to party R. Then, at the symmetric case, the equilibrium income
tax bene￿ts more group 3, not because is richer but because the income distribution is
right-skewed.
Party L faces a trade-o⁄ between maximizing the probability of winning favoring in-
formed voters in group 2 and maximizing total contributions from group 1 without increas-
ing too much contribution competition (indirect e⁄ect on CR).
Applying the implicit function theorem to (3) and (4) from properties and conditions





































We replace (8) in the ￿rst order condition for a maximum of party L. For g2 (g1g12 ￿ g2g11) 6=









































From (10) and (11), the equilibrium income tax in the private system will be closer
to t2 the higher are ￿1 and j￿3j. Note that at the equilibrium income tax we maximize a
weighted sum of voters utility. The weights on voters￿utility are inversely related to their
attachment toward parties, ￿j with j = 1;3.
Example 3 Assume g (CL;CR) = CL￿CR
2(CL+CR), that satis￿es conditions 1 ￿ 4. Contribution
14levels are: CL =
(1￿￿)￿2
1j￿3j
(￿1+j￿3j)2 , CR =
(1￿￿)￿1￿2
3













































￿1+j￿3j. In the symmetric case where ￿1 = j￿3j = ￿, for ￿ ￿ 2
3￿￿, the







2). It equals zero otherwise.
Example 4 Assume g (CL;CR) =
(CL)k￿(CR)k
2((CL)k+(CR)k), with 0 < k ￿ 1, that satis￿es conditions
1 ￿ 3 and 41. In the symmetric case where ￿1 = j￿3j = ￿, contribution levels are: CL =
CR = 1



















for ￿ ￿ 2
3k￿￿, and equals zero otherwise. Note that te decreases with k, which is a measure
of the e⁄ectiveness of campaign spending. The higher is k, the higher the competition for
(against) the contributions from group 3, the closer the tax rate will be to zero, the preferred
tax of group 3.
Example 5 Assume g (CL;CR) = lnCL ￿lnCR, that satis￿es conditions 1￿ 4 for ￿1,j￿3j
su¢ ciently close. In the symmetric case where ￿1 = j￿3j = ￿, contribution levels are:


















for ￿ ￿ 1
6￿￿, and equals zero otherwise. For this advertisement function, where only
absolute di⁄erence in campaign spending matters, it is easier to have a zero tax rate.
In all the examples, at the symmetric case, the marginal tax rate increases with ￿
and ￿ and decreases with ￿. Because, the higher is ￿ the lower is the political power of
ideological voters, as ￿ increases the marginal tax rate is closer to the median preferred
income tax rate. The higher the uncertainty toward the vote of informed voters in group
2, ￿, the lower the marginal bene￿t from favoring voters in group 2. The tax rate, then,
15approaches the preferred tax of group 3 (under the assumption that w2 < w). The larger
the proportion of informed voters the closer the tax rate will be to t2.
Note that the private system generates excessive spending, specially for ￿1 = j￿3j,
under which ￿ = 1=2. In this case parties would be equally well with CL = CR = 0,
but, the indirect e⁄ect through taxes make the di⁄erence. An ideological voter may prefer
an equilibrium with positive contributions if it induces a higher economic utility that
compensates for the cost of the contributions.
5.1 Cap on contributions
The introduction of a cap on contributions can have di⁄erent e⁄ects whenever it is stringent.
It decreases competition between lobbies by giving an upper bound to expenditure in
contributions. Ideological voters save money but the introduction of a cap on contributions
changes the equilibrium income tax announced by both parties.
Suppose C is the cap on contributions. If C > CR;CL, the contribution cap is not
stringent, then we still have the same results as in proposition 1.
We next show that an intermediate cap on contributions bene￿ts ￿rst decreases the
margin of victory of the ￿nancially stronger party and moves the income tax toward the
preferred tax of the unconstraint group. For example, consider a cap on contributions that
constraints party R : CL < C < CR. If both parties were choosing the same platform,
te, as in the absence of a cap, contributions to party L and party R would be CL and C,
respectively. Party L will ￿nd pro￿table to increase tL trading-o⁄between increasing party
L contributions and decreasing voter 2 utility with no e⁄ect on the rival party spending
blocked at C. But party R can decrease contributions to party L to the original level CL












From (12) it can be easily shown that the intermediate cap on contributions that con-
straint group 3 bene￿ts voters in group 1. The equilibrium income tax and the probability
of winning of party L will be higher than in the absence of a cap. If instead CR < C < CL
the equilibrium income tax will be smaller than te and the relative advantage of group
1 will decrease. The intermediate cap on contributions, then, bene￿ts the party that is
not constrained by the cap and their partisans. This is in contrast with Vanberg (2004),
16where the cap on contributions decreased competition between lobbies allowing the funding
advantaged group to save some money without any e⁄ect on the platform announced by
parties. Here, the intermediate cap on contributions lowers the political power of the inter-
est group contributing the most moving the equilibrium tax toward the preferred income
tax of the opposite group.
To summarize our ￿ndings,
Proposition 6 A very strict cap on contributions bene￿ts group 2. While an intermediate
level that only constraints the party with highest spending bene￿ts the group that contributes
to the opposite party.
Proof. In the appendix.
If the cap on contribution is su¢ ciently stringent it will decrease the margin of victory
but, the private system with a cap on contribution do not necessarily bene￿t the median
voter. Indeed for j￿3j > ￿1, in the absence of a cap te > t2, the cap on contributions,
whenever constraints group 3, moves the equilibrium tax further away from t2.
6 Public System
In the public system taxes are collected to ￿nance the lump-sum transfer r and a ￿xed
total cost of campaigning S: The new budget balance condition becomes,
r(t) = t￿(t) ￿ S
As in many European countries, parties obtain contributions in proportion to their voting
shares. Following Ortuæo-Ort￿n and Schultz (2005) we assume that today contributions
depend upon the expected voting share from the election. Under rational expectations the
expected voting share equals the e⁄ective voting share. We have a similar result to Ortuæo-
Ort￿n and Schultz; but here, since our parties are Downsian, the equilibrium income tax
corresponding to the public system fully converges to the median voter preferred income
tax.
Proposition 7 The equilibrium income tax corresponding to the public system is the me-
dian preferred income tax t2. The probability of party L of winning the election is ￿ = 1=2.
The equilibrium probability of winning will be unique as long as 2(1 ￿ ￿)Sg1 < 1.
Proof. In the appendix.
17Parties face no trade-o⁄. If they want to maximize the probability of winning there
is no point in attracting loyal voters (partisans) since they can not contribute. In order
to maximize contributions, parties have to increase the probability of winning. The equi-
librium income tax rate is then the median, w2, preferred income tax rate. The revenue
collected with such a tax has to be used to ￿nance redistribution and political campaign
with a ￿xed (exogenous) total cost of S.
7 Political support for the private system
From the results obtained in the previous sections we can assert that the comparison
between the private and the public system to ￿nance political campaign is not obvious.
Depending on the distribution of earnings ability and ideological preferences the equilibrium
income tax may be higher or lower than the preferred income tax of the median voter. Since
voters have economic and non-economic preferences (￿￿ s), we have to take into account
these preferences when comparing di⁄erent systems.
When comparing each voter￿ s welfare from each system the relevant information from
the private system is the equilibrium income tax, te; the probability of winning of party L
and the cost of campaigns. We know that in the public system the equilibrium income tax
is t2. The probability of winning of party L is 1
2. We assume the political campaign cost
is exogenous and equals S, which is the minimum expenditure needed to ￿nance political
parties campaigns. The public system does not waste resources, since S is small, and
bene￿ts the median voter.
Assume g (CL;CR) = CL￿CR
2(CL+CR) from Example 1. We restrict ￿1, ￿3 and ￿ to guarantee
a⁄ordable contribution levels, such that xj > Cj. Let Vj (t2) and Vj (te), with j = 1;2;3,
be the indirect utility of voter j in the public and private system, respectively. De￿ne
S￿
j = Vj (t2) ￿ Vj (te) + Cj,
S￿










2 ; j = 1;2;3
If S￿
j ￿ S, then voter j prefers the public to the private system. He prefers the private
system otherwise. The political support for the private system is then, decreasing in S￿
j.
Note that S￿
j is increasing in the level of contributions. As the intensity of preferences
toward the non-economic issue increases we have two direct e⁄ects: On the one hand
18the cost of political campaign increases in the private system, which increases support
for the public system. The probability of winning of the party associated with the voter
with relatively higher ￿ increases, which increases support by such a voter for the private
system. We also have an indirect e⁄ect through taxes, as ￿j increases the favored voter is
further away from wj, this increases j support for the public system. How the support for
the private system is determined as a function of ￿0s is not straightforward.









1 can be rewritten as,
S￿
1 = u1 (t2) ￿ u1 (te) +








Group 1 (similar for group 3) trade-o⁄s economic and ideological bene￿ts, net of cost,
that in general (at least in the asymmetric case) are not aligned.
In the symmetric case ￿ = 1
2. Then S￿
j = uj (t2) ￿ uj (te) +
(1￿￿)￿
4 . Intensity of
preferences toward parties increase S￿
j by increasing competition among ideological voters
that foster campaign contributions. Indirectly, the equilibrium income tax is closer to the
median preferred income tax as ￿ increases, since
1￿￿
4￿ is the (endogenously determined)
weight of ideological voters utility on the parties objective. Since uj (t2) ￿ uj (te) tends
to zero as ￿ increases, we expect less support toward the private system for ￿ su¢ ciently
large. To capture the di⁄erent trade-o⁄s, we develop a numerical example to shed light on
which e⁄ects dominates.
7.1 Numerical example
The parameter values we assume
￿
￿ = 1
4;wj; j = 1;2;3
￿
and variables values (w2;t2) that
we use through the example are the following:
Table I.a: Parameters
w1 w2 w3 w2 t2 r2
1 2 3 4.67 0.125 0.51
Table I.b: Parameters
w1 w2 w3 w2 t2 r2
1 1.5 3.5 5.17 0.36 1.19
Note that mean earnings ability equals 2 in both examples, but the distribution function
on Table 1.b is more right skewed, in other words inequality in earnings is higher since
median earnings ability, w2, is lower than average.
We next summarize the main results from observation of Tables II and III below.
19For any ￿ if ￿1 = j￿3j = ￿ the public system is preferred by the median voter and one
of the ideological voters. This holds as long as j￿1 + ￿3j is su¢ ciently small (note that
perfect symmetry implies j￿1 + ￿3j = 0).
If ￿1 > j￿3j the economic equilibrium will favor voters in group 3 (see section 4) and
the probability of winning of party L will be higher than 1
2. Being group 3 in those
cases less ideological, they will prefer the private system over the public system for any
S. Analogous for ￿1 < j￿3j, in which case group 1 will bene￿t for a larger redistribution
level in the private system. When is group 1 going to support the private system even
with ￿1 > j￿3j? She is going to support the private system as long as the non-economic
bene￿t (higher probability of winning of party L) outweighs the economic loss from less
redistribution. This is the case when j￿1 + ￿3j is su¢ ciently large, i.e. when intensity of
preferences toward parties are asymmetric enough.
The e⁄ect of the size of informed voters: A decreased number of informed voters makes
campaign contributions more e⁄ective. This is why the probability of winning of a given
party increases faster as the voters￿group ￿j associated to such party increases. In gen-
eral, the favored voter, ￿, gets further away from the median voter as the proportion of
uninformed voters increases.6
The e⁄ect of wage dispersion: Comparing tables a and b we observe that taxes and
redistribution are higher in type b tables where the median voter is poorer (w2 = 1:5).
Even though redistribution is higher, the favored voter is in general relatively richer than




i as a proxy of welfare of the public system with respect to the private
system, when preferences toward parties are asymmetric enough, higher welfare in the
public system is associated with a higher proportion of informed voters. When preferences
toward parties are symmetric higher welfare in the public system is associated with a lower
proportion of informed voters. From the tables below we can observe that welfare in the
public system is larger when inequality in earnings ability is low, but this seems to be true
when the asymmetry of ￿0s is small enough.8
6In type a tables, when ￿ =
1
2, the favored voter position do not decrease when ￿1 > j￿3j and do not
increase when j￿3j > ￿1 with respect to the position held at ￿ =
3
4, exceptions are found in type b tables.
7In absolute terms, for a given ￿, compare (￿ ￿ m)b ￿ (￿ ￿ m)a, the di⁄erence between the favored
voter earnings ability and the median voter earnings ability in type a and b tables. This di⁄erence is always
positive, which means that the favored voter at w2 = 1:5 is relatively richer with respect to the median
voter than the favored voter at w2 = 2.
8Computation for a broader range of parameters are available from author upon request.
20Table II.a: Results (￿ = 3=4)
￿1,j￿3j 3,.3 .3,3 3,3 .6,3 3,2 .3,.3 .3,.7
￿PR 0.704 0.295 0.5 0.333 0.55 0.5 0.4
￿ >2.16 1.773 2.062 1.845 2.125 >2.16 1.897
te 0 0.246 0.082 0.213 0.032 0 0.186
re 0 0.866 0.351 0.782 0.172 0 0.707
S￿
1 -0.158 -0.189 0.308 -0.078 0.311 0.412 -0.099
S￿
2 0.042 0.039 0.005 0.021 0.023 0.042 0.010
S￿
3 -0.477 -0.019 -0.0005 -0.010 -0.187 -0.525 0.234
P
S￿
i -0.593 -0.169 0.313 -0.067 0.148 -0.072 0.145
Table II.b: Results (￿ = 3=4)
￿1,j￿3j 3,.3 .3,3 3,3 .6,3 3,2 .3,.3 .3,.7
￿PR 0.704 0.295 0.5 0.333 0.55 0.5 0.4
￿ >2.27 1.471 1.829 1.573 1.955 >2.27 1.915
te 0 0.367 0.261 0.343 0.207 0 0.225
re 0 1.201 0.996 1.164 0.847 0 0.901
S￿
1 0.344 0.062 0.314 0.137 0.264 0.915 0.240
S￿
2 0.526 0.0002 0.040 0.001 0.096 0.526 0.075
S￿
3 -2.363 -0.509 -0.461 -0.512 -0.789 -2.41 -0.919
P
S￿
i -1.493 -0.446 -0.107 -0.374 -0.428 -0.971 -0.604
Table III.a: Results (￿ = 1=2)
￿1,j￿3j 3,.3 .3,3 3,3 .6,3 3,2 .3,.3 .3,.7
￿PR 0.909 0.091 0.5 0.167 0.6 0.5 0.3
￿ >2.16 1.708 2.082 1.801 2.16025 >2.16 1.884
te 0 0.273 0.067 0.233 0.007 0 0.193
re 0 0.925 0.290 0.836 0.034 0 0.727
S￿
1 -0.710 -0.161 0.542 0.005 0.453 0.431 -0.068
S￿
2 0.042 0.058 0.009 0.032 0.042 0.042 0.012
S￿
3 -0.409 -0.454 0.120 -0.313 -0.104 -0.507 0.232
P
S￿
i -1.078 -0.557 0.672 -0.277 0.391 -0.034 0.177
21Table III.b: Results (￿ = 1=2)
￿1,j￿3j 3,.3 .3,3 3,3 .6,3 3,2 .3,.3 .3,.7
￿PR 0.909 0.091 0.5 0.167 0.6 0.5 0.3
￿ >2.27 1.463 1.926 1.592 2.077 >2.27 1.960
te 0 0.369 0.220 0.337 0.142 0 0.204
re 0 1.203 0.887 1.155 0.629 0 0.838
S￿
1 -0.207 0.129 0.580 0.263 0.459 0.933 0.332
S￿
2 0.526 0.0003 0.080 0.002 0.194 0.526 0.100
S￿
3 -2.296 -1.049 -0.543 -0.941 -1.005 -2.394 -1.093
P
S￿
i -1.977 -0.920 0.116 -0.676 -0.353 -0.934 -0.662
From the previous numerical example we observed that it is possible to have a majority
of voters in favor of the private system to ￿nance political parties if their ideological pref-
erences toward parties are asymmetric enough. In more homogenous societies, the public
system dominates.
8 Conclusion
We study what would be the political support for the purely private system to ￿nance
political campaigns. It is worth noting that in our setting, the private system generates
excessive campaign spending if voters are strongly ideological and a non-median equilib-
rium redistribution level. Still, we can ￿nd a majority of voters in favor of the private
system because of the existing trade-o⁄ between ideological and economic preferences. In
other words, as a consequence of voters￿diversity on the intensity of preferences toward
parties, we can ￿nd two (ideological) voters that prefer the private system and only one
group favoring the public system. When ideological preferences are asymmetric enough all
ideological voters support the private system to ￿nance political parties. In the private
system the voter with the highest intensity of preferences obtains a higher probability of
winning for her preferred party than in the public system and the equilibrium income tax
is closer to the less ideological voter.
We also ￿nd di⁄erent economic implications that di⁄er from the ones existing in the
traditional literature. In the symmetric case, if the median voter is poorer than the mean
(w2 < w), it is true that the equilibrium tax rate in the private system is lower than the
22preferred tax rate of the median voter (in line with Roemer, 2006 and Ortuæo-Ort￿n and
Schultz, 2005). But, when we consider the asymmetric case the equilibrium income tax
may be higher or lower than the median voter preferred income tax. Income inequality
increases redistribution in absolute terms but the favored voter in the private system is
relatively richer than the median voter when inequality in earnings ability is large.
We analyze the political support and the economic e⁄ects of a private system to ￿nance
political parties￿campaign. In order to capture the individual incentives to make contri-
butions that we ￿nd empirically, we assume that voters are contributors. A service-motive
for political contributions may imply di⁄erent conclusions. An imperfect correlation be-
tween types, i.e. some voters in group one and three contribute to party R and party
L, respectively, will enrich our previous analysis. The introduction of service-motivated
contributions and an imperfect correlation between types is left for further research.
A Appendix
Proof of Symmetry on Contributions
If tL = tR, @CP
@tL = ￿@CP
@tR with P = L;R.
Contribution levels satisfy equations (3) and (4) simultaneously. De￿ne,
G1 = (1 ￿ ￿)g1 (V1;L ￿ V1;R) ￿ 1









are implicitly determined at G1 = 0, G2 = 0.
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jtL=tR=t= 0. Analogous for CR. As long as Vj is the same
23whatever the party implementing the policy (same prices wj) and the marginal cost of
contributions is constant, symmetry on contributions hold.
B Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1:
From (3), the f.o.c. of group 1￿ s problem, the slope of the best-response function


















. Since CR (CL (s)) is monotonic
decreasing in s with CR (CL (0)) > 0 and CR (CL (s)) ￿ s where s = maxfV3;L;V3;Rg.
Both CL (CR) and CR (CL), then, cross once at CR;CL > 0. If Condition 2 is satis￿ed the
equilibrium is asymptotically stable. From condition 4 the (0;0) equilibrium is precluded.
There exist, then, a unique equilibrium with positive contributions.
Proof of Proposition 1:
1) Platform convergence comes from the symmetry on contributions: @CP
@tL = ￿@CP
@tR ;
P = L;R, proved above (Appendix A). Suppose that at the equilibrium income tax second
order conditions are satis￿ed (we perform a numerical example at section 6 for which there
are satis￿ed). Then te that solves (5) when tL = tR = te maximizes ￿.











Applying the implicit function theorem to (3) and (4) when platforms converge we obtain
equations (8) and (8). Substituting those expressions in (15), the condition to have te > t2
is the following














jte=t2 > 0 (16)





> 0 (remember that











@tL = ￿(1 ￿ t2)(wi)
2 + (1 ￿ 2t2)w2, for i = 1;3, in the above equation and rearranging




























2 + ￿1 (w2)
2 ￿ ￿ j￿3j(w1)
2 ￿ ￿1 (w3)
2 > 0
It can be easily shown that the above condition leads to (7) in Proposition 1.
When ￿1 = j￿3j = ￿ from the contribution stage and symmetry on contributions, both
contribution levels are equal: CL = CR = C. From symmetry on contributions and dif-
ferentiability of g, the following equalities are satis￿ed: g22 (CL;CR) = ￿g11 (CR;CL) and
￿g12 (CR;CL) = g21 (CL;CR) = g12 (CL;CR). Then, at the symmetric case, ￿g12 (C;C) =





























This condition can not be satis￿ed for (w2)




















. From the variance of
w : w2 ￿ (w)
2 > 0, we have w2 > (w)
2, then, the following ordering is satis￿ed when
w2 < w: w2 > (w)
2 > (w2)
2. The equilibrium income tax is then, lower than t2 when
w2 < w and ￿1 = j￿3j.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Consider a strict cap on contribution such that CL;CR > C. Such a cap on contribution
decreases competition among ideological voters. It bene￿ts group 2 since the objective of
parties is just to maximize the utility of the swing voter (group 2). Indeed suppose both
parties announce t2, then the campaign spending by both parties equals C. A deviation
from t2 by one party decreases the political support of the swing voter to this party and
from the cap on contributions CP, P = L;R can not increase above C. Then,. Such a
deviation is not pro￿table.
Consider an intermediate cap on contribution, C, such that CL < C < CR. Consider
tR = te if party L bene￿ts their partisans (tL > tR) she increases the probability of winning
25among uninformed voters that compensate the possibly loss in median voter support, note
that @CR









Party R will ￿nd pro￿table to replicate party L platform, platforms converge in equi-
librium. When (tL;tR) = (t0
e;t0
e) the expression (17) equals zero a further increase (or
decrease) in tL will decrease party L0s probability of winning. Analogous for party R.















Proof of Proposition 3:










+ g (￿eS;(1 ￿ ￿e)S)
￿
At ￿e = 0; ￿ ￿ 0 and at ￿e = 1; ￿ ￿ 1. The rational expectations probability of winning
satis￿es ￿ is increasing in ￿e, provided that g (:) is increasing in ￿e, ￿e = 1=2 is a ￿x point,
given symmetry (at CL = CR, symmetry implies g1 = ￿g2 and g12 = 0) it will be an
in￿ ection point of ￿ (:). It will be unique if @￿
@￿ej￿e=1=2 < 1, this condition is satis￿ed for
all the advertisement functions given in examples 1 to 3. The objective function of party




























Clearly both parties choose the preferred tax rate of the median voter.
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